TurkStream and TANAP Explained: How Gas Reaches Europe Through Türkiye

Why It Matters

TurkStream and TANAP are two different pipeline systems that both cross Türkiye but serve opposite supply sources: TurkStream moves Russian gas under the Black Sea, while TANAP moves Azerbaijani gas overland from the Georgian border to the Greek border. Together they make Türkiye one of the few places where Russian and Caspian gas both pass into Europe's network, which matters for supply security, sanctions policy and Europe's effort to diversify away from Russian gas after 2022.

The short answer to the question 'What is the difference between TurkStream and TANAP?' is: origin, route, ownership and political meaning. TurkStream is a Gazprom-led project built to bypass Ukraine; TANAP is a Turkish-Azerbaijani-led project built to open a non-Russian route to Europe.

Background

How the two pipelines were built

TANAP (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline). Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) for TANAP in Istanbul on 26 June 2012. Construction began with a ceremony in Kars in March 2015. Gas first reached Türkiye's domestic network in June 2018, and TANAP began delivering to Europe on 30 November 2019 at the Greek border near İpsala. The line is roughly 1,850 km (about 1,150 miles) long. Its initial capacity is about 16 bcm per year (billion cubic metres), of which about 6 bcm is intended for Türkiye and about 10 bcm for Europe. Operators have described possible expansion stages to 23 and 31 bcm, but these remain options, not existing capacity.

TurkStream. Türkiye and Russia signed the TurkStream intergovernmental agreement in Istanbul on 10 October 2016, after the project was revived following the cancellation of the earlier South Stream plan. TurkStream was inaugurated in Istanbul on 8 January 2020. It starts at the Russkaya compressor station near Anapa on Russia's Black Sea coast, runs about 930 km offshore, and lands near Kıyıköy in Thrace. It has two strings of 15.75 bcm per year each, 31.5 bcm in total. The first string supplies the Turkish market; the second continues to Bulgaria and onward to Serbia, Hungary and other southeastern and central European markets.

Where TANAP fits: the Southern Gas Corridor

TANAP is the middle section of the Southern Gas Corridor, a chain of pipelines from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to Italy:

• Shah Deniz 2 field (Caspian Sea, Azerbaijani sector) supplies the corridor.
• South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) carries gas across Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish border.
• TANAP crosses Türkiye to the Greek border.
• Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) runs about 878 km through Greece, Albania and under the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. TAP started commercial operation in late 2020 with a capacity of about 10 bcm per year, expandable to about 20 bcm.

An interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria (IGB), which began commercial operation in October 2022 with a capacity of about 3 bcm per year, allows some Azerbaijani gas to reach Bulgaria and further north.

The Table

Feature	TurkStream	TANAP
Gas source	Russia (Gazprom)	Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 2, via SCP)
Route	Offshore across the Black Sea (about 930 km), landfall at Kıyıköy, Thrace	Overland across Anatolia, Georgian border to Greek border (about 1,850 km)
Capacity	2 x 15.75 bcm = 31.5 bcm per year	About 16 bcm per year (about 6 for Türkiye, about 10 for Europe)
Intergovernmental agreement	Türkiye-Russia, 10 October 2016	Türkiye-Azerbaijan, 26 June 2012
Main owners	Gazprom (offshore); BOTAŞ is Türkiye's state gas company and the Turkish buyer	SOCAR (majority), BOTAŞ (30%), BP (minority)
European link	Via Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and others	Via TAP to Greece, Albania, Italy; IGB to Bulgaria
Political role	Bypasses Ukraine; now sole Russian pipeline route to the EU	Non-Russian diversification route

Ownership percentages can change; readers should confirm current stakes on the operators' own websites.

Timeline

• 26 June 2012: Türkiye and Azerbaijan sign the TANAP IGA.
• 10 October 2016: Türkiye and Russia sign the TurkStream IGA.
• June 2018: TANAP delivers first gas to Türkiye.
• 30 November 2019: TANAP begins deliveries to Europe.
• 8 January 2020: TurkStream is inaugurated.
• December 2020: TAP begins commercial operation, completing the Southern Gas Corridor link to Italy.
• 24 February 2022: Russia launches its full-scale invasion of Ukraine; EU gas diversification becomes urgent.
• 18 July 2022: The EU and Azerbaijan sign a memorandum of understanding that aims to double Azerbaijani gas deliveries to the EU to at least 20 bcm per year by 2027.
• 1 January 2025: The Russia-Ukraine transit contract expires and pipeline gas transit via Ukraine ends, leaving TurkStream as the only Russian pipeline route to the EU.

How Much Gas Flows Through Türkiye?

The verifiable answer is capacity, not a single flow number. Nominal European-facing capacity is about 15.75 bcm per year on the second TurkStream string and about 10 bcm per year on TANAP's European share. TurkStream's first string (15.75 bcm) and the older Blue Stream pipeline from Russia (nominally 16 bcm per year, in operation since 2003) mainly serve the Turkish market.

Actual flows differ from capacity. Azerbaijan and SOCAR have reported exports to Europe in the range of roughly 11-12 bcm per year in recent years, delivered through TAP, as the EU-Azerbaijan memorandum seeks growth toward 20 bcm by 2027. Gazprom and independent trackers have reported TurkStream flows to Europe broadly close to the line's nominal capacity. For exact current figures, consult the transparency data from ENTSOG, TAP, TANAP and Gazprom, because monthly data move and annual totals are revised.

Key Players & Positions

European Union

After 2022, the European Commission's REPowerEU plan set out to end dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The Commission and member states have since moved toward legislating a phase-out of Russian gas imports, with end-2027 as the target date in the Commission's 2025 roadmap; final legal details should be checked in the EU Official Journal. The EU treats Azerbaijan as a partner for diversification, per the July 2022 memorandum, but it has not treated TurkStream as a long-term solution. Several EU member states, notably Hungary and Slovakia, have stressed their continued reliance on pipeline gas from Russia and have opposed rapid cut-offs.

Russia

Gazprom and the Russian government present TurkStream as a commercial, reliable, politically neutral route and point out that it connects Russia to Türkiye and southeastern Europe. Moscow has also supported the idea of a Thrace gas hub in Türkiye, proposed by President Vladimir Putin in October 2022.

Azerbaijan

President Ilham Aliyev and SOCAR describe the Southern Gas Corridor as a contribution to Europe's supply security. Baku has also been open about the physical limits of its production: Azerbaijani volumes can supplement but not replace the Russian volumes Europe once imported. The corridor's growth depends on new field development and, potentially, additional gas from the Caspian region.

United States

Successive US administrations have backed Southern Gas Corridor diversification as a strategic aim. Washington has been critical of TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 as tools of Russian influence: the US Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), enacted in December 2019, authorized sanctions on vessels involved in laying those pipelines. Subsequent US sanctions on Russian energy-related banks and companies have complicated payment arrangements for buyers of Russian gas, and Turkish and European buyers have sought waivers or workarounds.

Türkiye's Strategic Position

This section reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

• Supply security and diversification for Türkiye itself. According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Türkiye imports most of its natural gas and therefore diversifies suppliers and routes: Russia (Blue Stream and TurkStream), Azerbaijan (TANAP and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline), Iran, and LNG. Ankara argues that TANAP and TurkStream are not competing choices but complementary supply sources.
• Transit state and energy hub. Ankara argues that Türkiye's geography links major producers in Russia, the Caspian and the Middle East with European consumers. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has publicly supported the creation of a gas trading hub in Thrace, as reported by the Presidency, following the October 2022 proposal by President Putin. The hub concept has been discussed by Turkish officials but has not yet developed into a fully functioning, independent price-setting market. See Türkiye as an Energy Hub: Pipelines, Corridors and Transit Routes Explained.
• Treaty basis. Both pipelines rest on intergovernmental agreements: the Türkiye-Azerbaijan TANAP IGA of 26 June 2012 and the Türkiye-Russia TurkStream IGA of 10 October 2016. These texts set the legal framework for construction, operation and transit across Turkish territory. BOTAŞ, Türkiye's state-owned pipeline and gas company, holds a 30% stake in TANAP.
• Balanced foreign policy. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty while keeping channels open with Russia, including on energy. Türkiye has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, and Ankara argues that dialogue with both sides is essential for mediation. The same approach is visible in the Montreux Convention regime for the Straits; see The Montreux Convention Explained: Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security.
• A broader connectivity vision. Ankara presents energy corridors together with trade routes as part of a connectivity strategy; see The Middle Corridor Explained: Türkiye, Central Asia and Eurasian Trade Routes.

Source Comparison

Question	Western / EU framing	Russian framing	Azerbaijani framing	Turkish primary sources
What is TurkStream?	A residual Russian supply route that raises dependence and sanctions risk	A commercial pipeline for reliable supply	Rarely addressed directly	A complementary supply line and a source for the Turkish market
What is TANAP?	A diversification route with limited volumes	A competing but small route	A strategic export route and a regional integration project	A Turkish-Azerbaijani project and a core of the Southern Gas Corridor
Role of Türkiye	A transit country with a balancing act between Russia and the West	A reliable partner and potential hub host	A strategic transit partner	A sovereign energy hub pursuing diversification and supply security
Main uncertainty	How fast the EU will phase out Russian gas	Sanctions and payment channels	Production growth beyond about 12 bcm	The hub's market design, pricing and liquidity

When reading media coverage, check whether a figure refers to nameplate capacity, contracted volume or actual flow; they are often mixed up. This site's approach to sourcing is explained on the Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards page and in About Doctrinereview: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team. For other commonly repeated claims, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

What to Watch

• EU legislation: the final shape and timing of the Russian gas phase-out and how it treats existing long-term contracts.
• Azerbaijani volumes: whether new development at Shah Deniz and other fields supports growth toward the 20 bcm target by 2027.
• TANAP and TAP expansion decisions: capacity increases require commercial commitments from buyers.
• Sanctions and payments: changes in US and EU measures that affect the financing of Russian gas deliveries.
• Thrace hub: whether trading rules, pricing and infrastructure develop to make it operational.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• bcm: billion cubic metres, the standard unit for annual gas volumes (1 bcm is roughly 35 billion cubic feet).
• Intergovernmental agreement (IGA): a treaty-level agreement between states setting the legal framework for a pipeline.
• BOTAŞ: Türkiye's state-owned petroleum pipeline corporation, the main gas importer and a shareholder in TANAP.
• SOCAR: the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic.
• Southern Gas Corridor: the chain of pipelines (SCP, TANAP, TAP) carrying Azerbaijani gas to Europe.
• Nameplate capacity vs. actual flow: maximum design throughput versus measured gas delivered.

Related guides: Türkiye as an Energy Hub, The Black Sea Grain Initiative: How It Worked and Why It Ended, The Middle Corridor Explained, Doctrinereview: Energy, Climate and Corridor Diplomacy Explained, and Doctrinereview FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective.

Perspective Note

Doctrinereview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Published by the Doctrinereview Editorial Team.

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