The Black Sea Grain Initiative: How It Worked and Why It Ended

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was a UN- and Türkiye-brokered arrangement, signed on 22 July 2022, that let Ukraine export grain and other foodstuffs from its Black Sea ports despite the war. It ended in practice on 17 July 2023, when Russia declined to extend it. The episode is the clearest example of wartime commercial diplomacy in the Black Sea. It shows how a food-security arrangement can depend on unrelated sanctions, banking and logistics disputes.

The stakes were global. According to UN and FAO assessments, Russia and Ukraine together accounted for roughly a third of world wheat exports before the full-scale invasion of 24 February 2022. Ukraine was also among the main suppliers of corn and sunflower oil.

Background

The blockade and the food-price shock

After February 2022, Ukraine's seaports were effectively closed to normal commercial shipping. Grain stocks piled up, and the FAO Food Price Index reached record levels in spring 2022. The UN Secretary-General warned of a risk of food crises in import-dependent countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. The EU opened overland 'Solidarity Lanes' in May 2022 to move Ukrainian exports by rail, road and river, but their capacity could not replace the sea route.

The diplomatic track

Türkiye hosted the first high-level Russia–Ukraine foreign-minister meeting of the war on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 10 March 2022. On 29 March 2022, delegations from both sides met at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. Separately, UN Secretary-General António Guterres put forward a package in spring 2022 that linked Ukrainian grain exports to facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. Talks involving UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials led to the signing ceremony in Istanbul on 22 July 2022.

What was signed

According to the UN and Turkish accounts, the package consisted of two instruments:

• The Black Sea Grain Initiative (formally the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports). Reporting at the time indicated that Russia and Ukraine each signed with Türkiye and the UN rather than with each other.
• A memorandum of understanding between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to world markets. The UN committed to help remove obstacles to those exports.

How the mechanism worked

• Ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhny).
• Corridor: A designated maritime humanitarian corridor, with coordinates agreed through the JCC. Both sides committed to refrain from attacking vessels and port facilities covered by the arrangement.
• Joint Coordination Centre: Opened in Istanbul in late July 2022 with representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. It approved vessel registrations, sailing schedules and inspection plans.
• Inspections: Joint inspection teams boarded vessels in Turkish waters, checking inbound ships (to confirm they carried no cargo other than ballast) and outbound ships (to confirm cargo and absence of unauthorised items). Inspection delays and queues became a recurring point of friction.
• First sailing: The Razoni left Odesa on 1 August 2022. The World Food Programme's first chartered cargo, aboard the Brave Commander, was bound for Ethiopia.

Chronology

Date	Event
24 Feb 2022	Full-scale invasion; Ukrainian ports effectively closed to commercial shipping
10 Mar 2022	Lavrov–Kuleba meeting in Antalya, hosted by Türkiye
29 Mar 2022	Russia–Ukraine delegations meet in Istanbul
22 Jul 2022	Initiative and Russia–UN memorandum signed in Istanbul
1 Aug 2022	First commercial vessel (Razoni) departs Odesa
Nov 2022	Initiative extended for a further 120 days
Mar 2023	Extended again; Russia described the extension as 60 days, while Ukraine and the UN described it as 120 days
May 2023	Extended to 17 July 2023
17 Jul 2023	Russia declines to extend; Initiative lapses

The UN reported that about 33 million metric tonnes of grain and foodstuffs, on more than 1,000 voyages, left Ukrainian ports under the Initiative. Corn was the largest single commodity by volume and wheat the second. These figures come from UN and JCC reporting and may differ slightly between publications.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

The UN presented the package as a humanitarian and market-stabilising measure. Secretary-General Guterres repeatedly called the Black Sea arrangement and the Russia–UN memorandum two inseparable parts of one effort. UN officials, including UNCTAD's Rebeca Grynspan, who led contacts on the memorandum, said they worked on payment channels, insurance and port access for Russian food and fertilizer. After Russia's decision, the UN expressed regret and said it would keep seeking ways to facilitate exports from both countries.

Russia

Moscow's stated position, set out by President Putin, the Foreign Ministry and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, is that the memorandum on its own exports was never fully implemented. Its complaints centred on:

• restrictions on payments, including the disconnection of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) from the SWIFT messaging system;
• insurance, shipping and port-access obstacles;
• the non-resumption of the Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline;
• fertilizer assets and cargoes held in EU ports.

Russian officials also argued that much of the Ukrainian grain went to wealthier countries rather than the poorest, a claim the UN disputed with its own destination data, which showed a substantial share going to developing countries. After 17 July 2023, Russia said it would return to the Initiative if its conditions were met. Within days, its Defence Ministry announced that vessels heading to Ukrainian ports would be treated as potential carriers of military cargo.

Ukraine

Kyiv, through President Zelensky and its Infrastructure Ministry, described the Initiative as essential to its economy and to world food supply and accused Russia of using food as leverage. After the lapse, Russian strikes on Odesa-region and Danube port infrastructure intensified, according to Ukrainian and UN statements. In August 2023, Ukraine announced a temporary corridor along its own coastal waters, and commercial vessels began using it without the JCC mechanism.

European Union

Brussels, in statements by the European Council, the Commission and the High Representative, condemned Russia's decision. The EU's consistent position was that its sanctions do not target Russian food and fertilizer exports. It supported UN efforts on the memorandum while saying that Russian complaints about banking and logistics were being addressed through the UN process. The EU also expanded the Solidarity Lanes as an alternative route.

Türkiye's Strategic Position

This section summarises official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

• Mediator and co-signatory. According to the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and the Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA), Türkiye acted as a facilitator throughout: it hosted the Antalya Diplomacy Forum meeting of 10 March 2022 and the Istanbul talks of 29 March 2022, and it co-signed the 22 July 2022 agreements with the UN. Ankara argues that talking to both sides was possible because it maintains working relations with Moscow and Kyiv.
• Host and operator of the practical mechanism. Ankara states that the JCC in Istanbul and the inspection regime in Turkish waters were Turkish-hosted. Turkish Ministry of National Defence personnel took part in the coordination work. In Ankara's account, this practical role is what kept a deal between belligerents operational for a year.
• Food security as the stated priority. In statements by President Erdoğan and the Foreign Ministry, Türkiye has described the Initiative as a contribution to global food security, especially for developing and least-developed countries. Ankara has also emphasised that grain supply and the Russian food and fertilizer track should be treated together.
• Continued efforts after July 2023. After the lapse, President Erdoğan said publicly that he believed President Putin wanted the Initiative to continue and pledged to pursue its revival, including in his meeting with Putin in Sochi on 4 September 2023. Türkiye has said it remains ready to host renewed talks and to support any Black Sea food-export arrangement acceptable to all parties.
• Legal and historical basis. Türkiye's role rests on its status as a Black Sea littoral state and on its control of the Straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention. See The Montreux Convention Explained: Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security. Ankara also invokes the UN Charter's emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI, Article 33). It argues that diplomacy and a reduction of tensions, rather than escalation, best serve Black Sea security. Türkiye has also stated that it did not join Western sanctions on Russia, and Ankara links that independent position to its ability to mediate.

This broader mediation posture connects to Türkiye's argument for a more inclusive international order; see UN Security Council Reform: What 'The World Is Bigger Than Five' Means.

Source Comparison

Different sources emphasise different causes. The table shows broad framing differences rather than uniform positions.

Aspect	UN / EU / Ukrainian sources	Russian sources	Turkish primary sources
Purpose	Humanitarian and market-stabilising arrangement	Package deal in which Russian exports were to be normalised	Contribution to global food security; diplomacy that worked despite war
Reason for the end	Russia chose not to extend a functioning arrangement	Russian-side commitments were not implemented	Regret at the lapse; emphasis on resuming dialogue
Memorandum on Russian exports	UN says it worked on obstacles; EU says food and fertilizer are not sanctioned	Banking, insurance, ammonia pipeline and asset issues unresolved	Both tracks should be addressed together
Who benefited	Developing countries received a substantial share, per UN data	Wealthier countries received a disproportionate share	Global markets and the most vulnerable importers
Outlook	Alternative corridors and Solidarity Lanes	Return possible if conditions are met	Ready to host and mediate again

Readers comparing outlets should check whether figures cite the JCC or UN directly, as the Doctrinereview Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards require. Some commentary mixes the Black Sea Initiative with the separate memorandum, which obscures the dispute. For other frequently repeated claims about Türkiye's role, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul-based body, staffed by Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, that coordinated vessel movements and inspections.
• Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): The separate Russia–UN document on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. It is not part of the Initiative text.
• Humanitarian maritime corridor: The agreed sea lane from the three Ukrainian ports to Turkish waters and onward.
• SWIFT / Rosselkhozbank: The messaging network and the Russian state agricultural bank at the centre of Russia's payment complaints.
• Solidarity Lanes: The EU's overland and river routes for Ukrainian exports, launched in May 2022.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits.

Related guides:

• The Montreux Convention Explained: Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security
• The Middle Corridor Explained: Türkiye, Central Asia and Eurasian Trade Routes
• Türkiye as an Energy Hub: Pipelines, Corridors and Transit Routes Explained
• About Doctrinereview: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team

Perspective Note

Doctrinereview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article was prepared by the Doctrinereview Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Frontline Diplomacy: Black Sea Grain Initiative Explained: How the Deal Worked and Why It Ended — The Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: the July 2022 Istanbul agreements, how inspections worked, volumes, the Russia-UN memorandum and why it ended.
• WorldPoliticsDaily: How Did the Black Sea Grain Initiative Work and What Was Türkiye's Role? — Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: how the July 2022 deals worked, the Istanbul JCC, ship inspections, the Russia-UN memorandum, and why it ended.
• Crossroads Review: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, the UN-brokered grain deal and why it ended.