Can Eastern Mediterranean Gas Reach Europe Without Türkiye?

Doctrine Review Editorial Team

In-Depth Analysis· can Eastern Mediterranean gas reach Europe without Türkiye

Can Eastern Mediterranean Gas Reach Europe Without Türkiye? EastMed, Egyptian LNG and the Case for an Inclusive Energy Corridor

Can Eastern Mediterranean gas reach Europe without Türkiye? Compare EastMed, Egyptian LNG and a Turkish-grid link on cost, legal risk and EU policy.

DR

By Doctrine Review Editorial Team

Published: November 5, 2026

⏱ 10 min read (2,116 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Eastern Mediterranean gas can reach Europe without Türkiye today, but only as LNG shipped from Egypt's Idku and Damietta plants, whose combined nameplate capacity is commonly cited at about 12 million tonnes per year.
The EastMed pipeline (about 1,900 km, depths of up to roughly 3,000 m, initial design capacity of 10 bcm per year) has no final investment decision, and press reports in January 2022 said the United States no longer backed it.
UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 require maritime delimitation by agreement to reach an equitable solution, and the EU enlargement report is a policy assessment, not a delimitation forum.
Ankara argues that any durable regional energy architecture must include Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots, citing the 2011, 2012 and 2019 TRNC cooperation proposals and President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference.
Legal and political risk is a cost line: the February 2018 interruption of an Eni drillship off Cyprus shows why lenders and insurers price disputed jurisdiction into project finance.

Why It Matters

Eastern Mediterranean gas can reach Europe without Türkiye, but only in limited volumes, mainly as LNG shipped from Egypt's Idku and Damietta plants. The EastMed pipeline stalled after reported US reluctance in 2022, while a link through Türkiye's grid remains discussed. Maritime jurisdiction and Turkish Cypriot rights shape how investable every route is.

On 4 November 2026 the European Commission's annual enlargement report again addressed the Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnector, the Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum and Aegean issues. The same day, TRNC Prime Minister Ünal Üstel told UN envoy María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar that efforts toward a federal settlement ended at Crans-Montana in 2017 (TRT World). This article does not repeat the legal fact-checks already published on the cable. It asks the commercial question: which routes can move gas, at what cost and risk?

Background

The region's gas era began with Tamar (2009), Leviathan (2010), Aphrodite (2011) and Egypt's Zohr (2015), but export routes lagged discovery. Maritime boundaries are only partly delimited, Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS, and Cyprus remains divided. Each of these factors complicates the corridor economics.

The realistic export options

The table separates what exists from what is proposed. Figures are those widely cited by promoters or trade press, and costs differ by source and date. Where Doctrinereview could not verify a figure, it is omitted.

Route	Status	Verifiable scale or specification	Main constraint
Egyptian LNG (Idku and Damietta)	Operating	Nameplate about 7.2 mtpa (Idku) and about 5 mtpa (Damietta), roughly 12 mtpa combined, or about 16–17 bcm a year at about 1.36 bcm per mtpa (our conversion)	Feed-gas availability and Egyptian domestic demand; Egypt turned to LNG imports in 2024
EastMed subsea pipeline	Intergovernmental agreement signed 2 January 2020 (Greece, Cyprus, Israel); no final investment decision	About 1,900 km, depths up to roughly 3,000 m, initial capacity 10 bcm a year, cost cited by promoters at about €6 billion	Deep-water engineering, long-term offtake contracts, shrinking EU support for new gas
Pipeline to Türkiye's grid, then Europe	Studied, not built	No public, audited costing verified by Doctrinereview	Israel–Türkiye political relations since the Gaza war, plus the unresolved Cyprus jurisdiction question
Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnector	Under development	Electricity, not gas; about 2,000 MW; the Crete–Cyprus segment is roughly 900 km at depths reported up to about 3,000 m; early reporting cited about €1.9 billion, with later totals varying by source	Survey and permitting disputes; it does not export gas

The interconnector matters to regional security of supply, but it cannot answer the gas-export question. The Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction dispute explained guide sets out the legal map behind these routes.

Why EastMed lost momentum

In January 2022, Reuters and other outlets reported that Washington had sent Greece, Cyprus and Israel a non-paper saying it no longer supported EastMed. The reported reasons were economic viability and environmental concerns, and the reports said Washington would focus on electricity interconnection and renewables. The United States did not publish the document, so accounts rest on press reporting and officials' later comments. Neither Athens nor Nicosia has formally withdrawn from the 2020 agreement.

The commercial and technical headwinds are documented separately:

Engineering: a deep-water crossing of about 1,900 km, with trade-press analysts also citing seismically active seabed.
Contracts: pipelines need committed volumes and long-term buyers, and Israeli volumes are already committed to Egypt and Jordan by pipeline.
EU policy: the revised TEN-E Regulation (EU) 2022/869 ended Project of Common Interest eligibility for most new natural gas projects.
Alternative: the EU, Egypt and Israel signed a memorandum on 15 June 2022 in Cairo to export Israeli gas to the EU via Egypt's LNG plants.

Key chronology

Date	Event
17 Feb 2003	Cyprus–Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement signed
From 2004	Türkiye registers its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum
2 Jan 2020	EastMed intergovernmental agreement signed in Athens
18 Mar 2020	Türkiye registers its continental shelf outer limits with the UN
Jan 2022	Press reports of the US non-paper on EastMed
12 Jun 2025	Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning (unveiled 16 April 2025) recorded with IOC-UNESCO
4 Nov 2026	Commission enlargement report published

Key Players & Positions

Every party presents its position as a matter of rights and rules. The differences lie in who holds the rights and which forum decides. This section attributes each position to the party's own channels and, where the party's own text was not available, to the press reports that describe it.

Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration. Athens and Nicosia say they exercise sovereign rights under UNCLOS, with islands generating full maritime zones, and that the interconnector is lawful. Nicosia has said hydrocarbon revenues go to a national fund for all Cypriots, with Turkish Cypriots benefiting after a settlement. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt have rejected the Türkiye–Libya memorandum. The European Council's December 2019 conclusions said it infringes the rights of third states.
European Commission. According to Greek Herald and Greek City Times, the 4 November report acknowledged improved Greek–Turkish relations since 2023, but flagged airspace violations, disputed maritime claims, the Libya memorandum, interference with the interconnector and Ankara's longstanding threat of war against Greece. The Commission's energy documents, including the 2014 Energy Security Strategy and the 2022 REPowerEU communication, stress diversification of suppliers and routes. They list the Southern Gas Corridor, which runs through Türkiye, among priorities. The Commission's 2025 roadmap proposed ending Russian gas imports by the end of 2027.
Egypt. The Ministry of Petroleum and EGAS present Egypt as a regional LNG hub. Its plants are the only existing liquefaction outlet for Israeli and Cypriot gas, and capacity is limited by domestic demand.
Israel. Israel is party to the 2020 EastMed agreement and the 2022 memorandum, and exports pipeline gas to Egypt and Jordan.
United States. Washington supported the 3+1 format of the US with Greece, Cyprus and Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (founded in Cairo in 2019; Türkiye is not a member). It reportedly stepped back from EastMed in 2022. Foreign Policy Journal reports deepening US–Cyprus defense ties after January 2025 authorization to join US procurement programs, which adds a security dimension to the energy map.
TRNC and the UN. Prime Minister Üstel says the federal model ended at Crans-Montana. The UN's formal framework remains a bizonal, bicommunal federation under Security Council resolutions.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's argument is that the energy map and the legal map cannot be separated. The points below summarize Turkish official positions, attributed to Turkish sources, and are kept separate from the neutral factual sections above.

Equity-based delimitation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, maritime areas must be delimited by agreement on the principle of equity, and islands cannot cut off the projection of the longest mainland coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (870 km). Ankara notes that UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 themselves call for an 'equitable solution'. Türkiye is not an UNCLOS party and describes itself as a persistent objector to provisions it rejects, particularly on islands. It relies on equitable principles in ICJ case law since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases. It cites its UN registration of 18 March 2020 and the Marine Spatial Planning registration with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. See the Kastellorizo and island-effect case law analysis for how this debate looks in the case law.
Turkish Cypriot rights. Ankara argues that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic, hold equal rights over offshore resources, so joint decision-making and revenue sharing are required. This rests on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the partnership structure of the 1960 settlement.
No excluded architecture. Ankara argues that no durable regional energy arrangement can exclude Türkiye and the TRNC, and has offered an inclusive conference.
EU competence. Turkish officials have in previous years rejected enlargement-report passages on Cyprus and the Aegean, arguing that the EU cannot adjudicate maritime delimitation between a candidate country and member states. Doctrinereview has not verified a formal MFA response to the 2026 text, so readers should check mfa.gov.tr.
Existing infrastructure. Ankara points to its existing pipeline and LNG import infrastructure as the lowest-cost link to European markets. The Türkiye energy hub pipelines guide covers this infrastructure, and the fact check on the 'gas hub' claim covers the criticism that it is a Russian scheme.

What the cooperation proposals offered

As described in Turkish MFA and TRNC statements, the TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 centred on joint management of hydrocarbon activity and an equitable share of revenues pending a settlement. The 2019 version envisaged a joint committee. Nicosia has answered that revenues belong in a fund for all Cypriots, and President Anastasiades floated an escrow-type arrangement in 2019. The two sides therefore disagree on who decides, not only on who benefits.

President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal, including in his September 2020 UN General Assembly address, called for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference of all coastal states, including the TRNC, to discuss fair sharing. It has not been convened.

Source Comparison

Source framing explains why the same route is a sovereignty issue to some outlets and a cost issue to others. Greek Herald and Greek City Times frame Türkiye's conduct as violations; EU documents frame rules and diversification; trade press frames capacity and finance; Turkish primary sources frame equity and inclusion.

Source type	Typical frame	Emphasis	Examples
Greek and Greek Cypriot outlets	Violations of member-state sovereignty; warnings to Ankara	Sovereignty	Greek Herald, Greek City Times
EU institutional documents	Rules-based order, diversification, Union solidarity	Rules and supply security	Enlargement report, REPowerEU, TEN-E
Energy industry and trade press	Capacity, depth, offtake, final investment decision	Cost and logistics	LNG and pipeline trade coverage
Turkish primary sources	Equity principle, Turkish Cypriot rights, inclusive conference	Rights and inclusion	MFA, Presidency, Directorate of Communications, TRT World

The most useful reading cross-checks all four. Greek and EU texts accurately report the member-state position, and Turkish texts accurately report Ankara's. Trade press shows that the project failed mainly on economics, which neither side's sovereignty framing explains. Sister publications in the Doctrinereview network are same-publisher analyses and not independent sources. For the legal side, see the subsea frontier analysis on UNCLOS Article 79 and the Seville Map fact check on EU competence.

Why legal risk is a price

Lenders and insurers treat unresolved jurisdiction as a cost. UNCLOS Article 79 lets states lay pipelines on the continental shelf, but the pipeline's course needs the coastal state's consent. In February 2018 the Saipem 12000 drillship, contracted by Eni, was stopped by Turkish warships on its way to a Cyprus block. Overlap between Greek Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and Türkiye's declared shelf, and the Turkish Cypriots' claim, explain that risk. The Cronos gas field Cyprus Block 6 Türkiye objection article covers one such block.

The EU's competence is also limited. The enlargement report assesses candidate compliance. Delimitation between a non-member and member states is a matter for the states concerned, by agreement or by the ICJ or arbitration. European Council conclusions have themselves called for peaceful settlement of such disputes.

These terms recur in route comparisons. Each link points to a deeper guide on this site.

bcm / mtpa: billion cubic metres of gas per year, and million tonnes per annum of LNG. Roughly 1.36 bcm equals 1 mtpa.
EEZ and continental shelf: the 200-nautical-mile zone and the seabed rights. See Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction.
Persistent objector: a state that consistently rejects a developing customary rule. Türkiye uses it for island-related rules.
PCI / TEN-E: the EU's Projects of Common Interest and trans-European energy network rules.
Southern Gas Corridor: the route from Azerbaijan to Europe through Türkiye. See TurkStream vs TANAP difference explained.
Middle Corridor: for east–west corridor logic, see what is the Middle Corridor trade route.

Doctrinereview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' (labelled 'Türkiye's Strategic Position' elsewhere on the site) reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. See our Editorial Principles.